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THE LEGALITY

OF PRESIDENT TRUMP’S

MISSILE STRIKE
ON AL-SHAYRAT

AIR FORCE BASE IN SYRIA

BY JACOB BEHMER1
I.

SYRIA HAS BEEN FIGHTING A CIVIL WAR IN WHICH
PRESIDENT BASHAR AL-ASSAD HAS CONTINUALLY
USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN CONFLICT WITH
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ULTIMATELY
LEADING PRESIDENT TRUMP TO TAKE MILITARY
ACTION.

Before delving into the illegality or legality of President Trump’s actions—
when he ordered the Tomahawk missile bombings from the USS Ross and
the USS Porter to the al-Shayrat Syrian Air Force Base—the first question
that must be answered is what led to the strike. This paper will begin with a
brief synopsis of the Syrian Civil War, which led to the use of chemical
weapons against the Syrian people. Next, it will discuss the international
sentiment on the use of chemical weapons and define the position of the
United States on President Bashar al-Assad’s continued use of these weapons
in the Syrian Conflict. Third, it will detail the strike ordered by President
Trump in response to the chemical weapon attack. Finally, this paper will
provide a discussion on the competing international law stances on the
legality of President Trump’s action, ultimately concluding that it was lawful.
The Syrian Civil War
The Syrian Civil War started around the time of the Arab Spring in 2011.2
Syria’s sitting president, Bashar al-Assad, who had taken power as heir in
2000, was faced with a demand for reform. 3 Originally, he had convinced the
public to believe that he sided with the revolution and had received
1
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Syrian President Bashar al-Assad: Facing down rebellion, BBC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/10338256.
3
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considerable political support through his introduction of Western
economics. However, despite being capitalistic, the Syrian government
showed no signs of democracy nor the type of intragovernmental reform that
the rebels wanted.4 When the time of the Arab Spring began, Bashar al-Assad
took a stern stance; he “gave orders to crush the dissent, rather than tolerate
it, and he refused to meet protesters’ demands.” 5 The use of force did not stop
the protesters and the fighting escalated. 6 The “UN says the conflict has left
250,000 people dead . . . 11 million others have been forced from their homes
as forces loyal to Mr. Assad and those opposed to his rule battle each other –
as well as jihadist militants from Islamic State (IS).” 7
The country now is in turmoil: President al-Assad is still in power in
Damascus, the opposing rebel forces intermingle near Aleppo and the
Southeast part of the country, and the Kurdish forces and ISIL are exploiting
the chaos by holding ground in the Northeast part of Syria. 8 As the fighting
has continued, many countries have been monitoring the situation and have
taken sides. The Sunni rebels are supported by Western countries, including
the United States, while the Alawite-led government military is supported by
Russia and Iran.9 The conflict is ongoing, and Bashar al-Assad believes that
he is fighting terrorists who are supported by the West. 10 This controversy
has led to the use of chemical weapons.
The Chemical Strike on Khan Shaykhun
On April 4, 2017, the Syrian town of Khan Shaykhun was hit by an airstrike
that released a chemical weapon nerve agent, sarin, and caused massive
civilian poisoning.11 The first numbers reported 58 deaths, 11 of which were
children.12 The death toll promptly rose to 84 civilians, including 27 children
and 19 women.13 This is not the first time gas has been used to try to break
the spirit of the rebels in Syria. In the past, the Syrian government has used
chlorine strikes sporadically and sarin gas in the suburbs of Damascus in
4
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2013.14 The attack on Damascus was the largest attack utilizing chemical
weapons until the attack at Khan Shaykhun in 2017. 15
The Syrian government sent the air strike into Khan Shaykhun because it
believed the town to be a rebel hold, or in its vernacular, a location where
terrorists were hiding. 16 The government claims the bombs hit a terrorist
depot of sarin gas, resulting in the viral spread. 17 The government continually
denies responsibility for the use of the sarin gas and Russia supports this
denial.18 Some argue it makes sense; President Assad used chemical weapons
at this time of the conflict. He has been fighting for six years. His “military
gains since 2015 have been slow and costly,” and when that happens, it is
common for militaries to look for one decisive blow instead of a long drown
out conflict potentially killing more people. 19
The United States, along with the U.K. and many other countries, firmly
believes that President Bashar al-Assad is responsible for the use of sarin gas.
Sir Geoffrey Adams—the UK Permanent Representative to the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons(OPWC)—stated that, “[t]he United
Kingdom’s assessment is that it is almost certain that the Syrian Government
was responsible for a sarin attack . . . There is no evidence to suggest that any
party . . . other than the Syrian Government, has access to a complex nerve
agent such as sarin gas.” 20 The United Nations OPCW reported the villages
were indeed poisoned by sarin gas. 21 It did not answer the question of who
was responsible for the attack; rather, confirmed the outcome everyone
already knew: simply that sarin gas was present. 22 After the investigations, it
is reasonable to conclude the attack was effectuated by President Bashar’s
military.
International Stance on Chemical Weapons
14
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7, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/07/syria-nerve-agent-attack-why-it-madesense-to-assad.
20
Sir Geoffrey Adams, 55 th Special Session of OPWC Executive Council, Foreign &
Commonwealth Office (Jul. 5, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/55th -specialsession-of-opcw-executive-council.
21
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The reason the attacks have been given so much media attention is not only
because of the gripping images of the inhuman way in which the Syrian
civilians died, but also because the use of chemical weapons is in direct
conflict with international sentiment. The sentiment is, the use of these
weapons is an egregious violation of international and natural law. The
OPCW actually won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013 “for its extensive efforts
to eliminate chemical weapons.” 23 In 1997, the OPCW put into force the
Chemical Weapons Convention (“CWC”), which Syria, along with 192 other
countries, signed.24 That is ninety-eight percent of the world’s population. 25
The treaty, under Article 1, makes sure that each party “never under any
circumstances” develops, holds, uses, prepares to use, or assists a party in
using chemical weapons. 26 This treaty leaves no room for gray area, rather it
provides specific expectations for the countries who are party to it.
In 2013, Syria was responsible for the Ghouta chemical attack. This attack
used rockets controlled by the Syrian government to deliver sarin gas to the
suburbs of Damascus, resulting in the death of at least 200 people. 27 After
this attack Syria internationally acknowledged that it had chemical weapons
and agreed to the CWC. 28 The national governments were in such
international agreement, that chemical weapons were wrong, that Russia and
the United States actually worked together to develop an accelerated plan for
the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. 29 This plan was endorsed by
United Nations Security Council in Resolution 2118 which was unanimously
voted into effect and detailed the nuts and bolts for destruction. 30 Ninetyeight percent of the countries agreed not to use chemical weapons, this paints
a clear picture of the international stance on their use. Additionally, Russia
and the United States were able to work together on something that was
unanimously passed by the security council. All of these factors point to the
obvious—that chemical weapon use is not condoned by the international
community.
Since the use of chemical weapons is condemned, the next inquiry is into the
consequences of breaking the CWC. Richard Price—of the University of
British Columbia—suggests, if someone breaks the CWC it may trigger
23

The Nobel Peace Prize 2013, Nobel Prize,
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2013/.
24
Chemical Weapons Convention, Wikipedia,
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25
Id.
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Chemical Weapons Convention, C.N.246.1994.TREAT IES-5, art. 1, ¶ 1 August 31, 1994).
27
Wikipedia, supra note 13.
28
Wikipedia, supra note 23.
29
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Security Council action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 31 It would
invoke Chapter VII as “a threat to international peace and security.” 32 The
Security Council, if so inclined, could then authorize action by other member
states against the party in breach of keeping international security and
peace.33 This international norm of not using chemical weapons demands
reprisal with U.N. authorization.
United States Stance on the Chemical Weapon Use by Syria
In 2012, President Obama created a “red line” or a “line in the sand” stance
towards Syria’s use of chemical weapons, stating he would use force if Syria
“crossed the red line” by using chemical weapons. 34 This “red line for us is
we start to see a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being
utilized.”35 To be very clear, President Obama’s stance in 2012, was that the
use of chemical weapons by President al-Assad “would cross the ‘red line’
triggering an American military response.” 36
The next year in 2013, President Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons in
the aforementioned Ghouta attack. Much to the surprise of the community,
President Obama did not carry through with his threat of force. Instead, he
applauds himself on “broker[ing] a deal without a strike to get those chemical
weapons out . . . an outcome that would not have been possible with
airstrikes.” 37
There has been significant debate about whether President Obama should
have followed through with military action, but former Secretary of State
John Kerry believes that President Obama had made the right call. 38 Kerry
states that deference to Congress is always preferable in deciding whether to
31

Maarten Rikken, Consequences of Assad’s chemical weapons use in Syria, and the world ,
Research Gate (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.researchgate.net/blog/post/consequences-of-assadschemical-weapons-use-in-syria-and-the-world.
32
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35
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use force. However, President Obama would not have been unwilling to use
force to remove the chemical weapons. The chemical weapons were being
removed; consequently, there was no reason to act on the threat. 39 Prior to
the Khan Shaykhun chemical attack; President Obama, Russia, and the
Security Council viewed this as a victory for international peace. President
Obama did not condone the use of chemical weapons. Even though he did
not punish the Syrian government for its horrific act, because of the work
done by the United States and Russian governments, he believed Syria no
longer had chemical weapons. Unfortunately, despite the efforts and
agreements to eliminate the weapons, sarin gas was used again in Syria in
2017. Why cease this use if you are never held accountable?
President Trump’s Attack in Response to Khan Shaykhun
On April 7, 2017, President Trump ordered a response to the chemical attacks
that took place at Khan Shaykhun. The strike took place at 3:40 a.m. local
time, and targeted specific portions of the al-Shayrat Syrian Air Force base,
where intelligence believed the sarin attacks originated.40 The attack was
carried out by Tomahawk missiles that were launched from United States
Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers—the USS Porter, and
the USS Ross.41 Thirty-six of the missiles were fired from the USS Ross, and
twenty-three from the USS Porter. 42 They were fired at night when the base
was likely to have the least amount of movement and destroyed the intended
targets.43 According to Syria’s Armed Forces General Command, six people
were reported killed in the missile strike. 44
President Trump stated, “[t]here can be no dispute that Syria used banned
chemical weapons, violated its obligations under the Chemical Weapons
Convention and ignored the urging of the UN Security Council. Years of
previous attempts at changing al-Assad’s behavior have all failed and failed
very dramatically.” 45 Various news outlets report that this is a change in
Trump’s stance toward Syria and indicate that, based on his campaign
promises, his actions are hypocritical. 46 However, Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson believes that the attacks were in line with Trump’s policy, claiming
that “President Trump is willing to act when governments and actors cross
39

Id.
Barbara Starr and Jeremy Diamond, Trump launches military strike against Syria, CNN (Apr.
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the line . . . and cross the line in the most heinous of ways . . . and that the
attack was appropriate and proportional.” 47
Not everyone feels as emphatic as President Trump’s administration does
about this matter. Dimitri Peskov—a spokesman for President Vladimir
Putin—relays that this is “a significant blow to relations between Russia and
America, which are already in a poor state.” 48 Russia claims this as an act of
aggression.49 Peskov adds, “this creates a serious obstacle for building of an
international coalition to fight it and to effectively resist this universal evil.” 50
This is of course, after the Russians previously claimed Syria never used the
chemical weapon sarin gas in the first place.
Not only is there foreign distaste for President Trump’s action, but there is
also domestic dissatisfaction. There has been criticism that President
Trump’s actions were too rushed. The day of the strike, CNN posted that the
attack “represents a substantial escalation of the U.S. military campaign in
the region, and could be interpreted by the Syrian government as an act of
war.”51 This also represents the first time the United States has acted with
force in the Syrian Civil War. 52 While President Trump’s action received
support from a majority of lawmakers in Congress, there are still people in
opposition and his actions remain in debate today. 53
While the Syrian government did not approve of President Trump’s response
to Syria’s chemical attack, there were some Syrians who did. The Syrian
government described it as a “disgraceful” and “short-sighted” act.54 But
those who are tired of the Syrian Civil War, and the actions taken by
President Assad because of it, have praised President Trump. 55 These are the
words of Kassem Eid—a survivor of the 2013 Ghouta chemical attacks—"I
cried out of joy, I jumped . . . we have been asking for protection, we have
been asking for consequences for more than six years, and today for the first
time it happened . . . he[President al-Assad] was held accountable for his
crimes against humanity.” 56

47
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There is much speculation as to whether President Trump had the legal
authority to conduct the missile strike on al-Shayrat Syrian Air Force Base.
The following sections of this paper will discuss the competing arguments
for the illegality or legality of President Trump’s actions.
II.

PRESIDENT TRUMP’S ACTION WERE ARGUABLY
ILLEGAL VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
BECAUSE: (1) IT WAS AN ACT OF AGRESSION; (2) IT
WAS NOT DONE IN SELF-DEFENSE; (3) IT WAS NOT
APPROVED BY THE UNITED NATIONS; AND (4) IT
WAS NOT IN LINE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF JUS IN
BELLO.

As earlier discussed, it is evident that the international community does not
condone the use of chemical weapons. 57 Despite this consensus, the use of
force is only justified against another sovereign state in acts of self-defense,
or by the Security Council of the United Nations’ authorization, which is
granted through a sanction. 58 The first three arguments deal with jus ad
bellum, or the law of war, arguing that action should not have been taken in
the first place. The final argument deals with jus in bello, or the law in war,
stating, even if acting was legal the way action was taken was not.
First, it is true that striking a Syrian Airbase would be considered a use of
force and would be defined as an act of aggression. Second, this action clearly
was not done in defense of the American people, but this does not necessarily
make the action illegal unless it wasn’t authorized by the U.N. This leads to
the third question of whether that authorization existed. The third argument
for the action’s illegality is that there was no specific resolution authorizing
the use of force against Syria without clear advanced approval by the U.N.
Finally, some argue the United States did not follow the principles of jus in
bello in the strike against Syria. Considering all of these arguments, the
strongest is the United States did not have U.N. authorization to use armed
force against Syria.
The strike on al-Shayrat was an unjustifiable act of aggression by the
United States against Syria violating Article VII of the United Nations
Charter.
The tomahawk missile strike was, without question, a use of military force
against a sovereign state. Thus, if the United States can claim no other legal
57
58

See supra Part I.
U.N. Charter.
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authority allowing its action, it may be considered an unlawful act of
aggression. In an effort to promote international peace and security, the
United Nations condemns acts of aggression. The definition of aggression
given by the United Nations General Assembly is “the use of armed force by
a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence
of another State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations.”59 The definition is further expanded in Article 2, which purports,
“the first use of armed force by a state in contravention of the Charter shall
constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression.” 60 However, the
Article grants the Security Council the ability to decide whether an act of
aggression would be justified or not given the relevant circumstances. 61 The
Security Council’s ability to make this determination is similarly provided in
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and expressly deals with acts of aggression.62
Here, the use of fifty-nine United States tomahawk missiles against a Syrian
airbase is obviously a use of armed force under the Article 2 definition of
aggression. CNN reported people believe this may be an act of aggression
under international law, or greater still, an act of war. 63 Those who argue that
may be correct in the fact that this is prima facie aggression and it was not
used for self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 64 Syria denies
having used chemical weapons with Russia’s backing, and although an
investigation clearly established that sarin gas was used, no responsibility
was assigned. President al-Assad even goes so far as to say the attacks were
made up; claiming that the children really didn’t die and answering questions
concerning the attacks with, “Definitely, 100 percent for us, its fabrication.” 65
Certainly, if the United States did not believe that the sarin gas attack came
from Syrian forces the attack would be an unjustifiable act of aggression
making it illegal.
On the other hand, if the United States did believe sarin gas was used to kill
the civilians, and it did come from Syrian forces, the U.S. response may not
have been illegal if the Security Council authorized it. The real question in
determining legality is whether the act is one the United Nations would
condemn as an act of aggression or one it would approve or authorize.
Whether such authorization exists will be discussed later in this Note.

59
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65
Rick Gladstone, Assad Says Videos of Dead Children in Syria Chemical Attack Were Faked ,
N.Y. T IMES (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/middleeast /assad-syriavideo-faked.html.
60

92 UNIV OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13:2

However, absent authorization, the act may be considered an illegal act of
aggression against Syria.
The strike was not an act of self-defense, because President Bashar did not
attack the sovereign United States of America.
The attack on al-Shayrat was not done in defense of the United States of
America. Although this point may be obvious, it is worth mentioning,
because it can be used as a reason for proscribing President Trump’s action
as illegal. If the only way the use of armed force can be considered
permissible is for self-defense or by Security Council resolution, then it first
must be established the action was not done in self-defense.
The law on self-defense can also be found in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
as well. Article 51 holds, “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security.”66 Daniel Webster, in a case known as the Caroline Case—in which
a U.S. citizen was killed by the U.K. when attacking Canada—established a
test to identify what may be considered self-defense. He says that there must
be “a necessity of self-defence,[that is] instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.” 67 The force used must also
not be in excess of more than what is necessary. 68
It is easy to surmise President Trump’s actions were not in self-defense. The
sarin gas attack was not an imminent threat against the United States because
it had already happened. Although Article 52 allows for the self-defense of a
membered nation, the rebels within Syria are not a member to the U.N. and
this attack occurred after the fact. A far-reaching argument could be made
that the bombing of the airbase, from which the chemical weapons came
from, could have prevented future chemical weapon attacks and, as a result,
would be justifiable as preemptive self-defense. However, the attack was not
against the United States or a member state to the U.N. and therefore, cannot
be justified by the international law of self-defense.
The United Nations did not authorize the use of force against Syria.

66

U.N. Charter art. 51.
Webster, Daniel. Letter to Henry Stephen Fox in K.E Shewmaker (ed.). The Papers of Daniel
Webster: Diplomatic Papers, vol. 1. 1841-1843 (1983) 62. Dartmouth College Press.
68
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67
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If armed force is not used in self-defense, then it is typically deemed
justifiable only if it was authorized by the Security Council. Being that it was
not done in self-defense, the main argument for illegality is that Resolution
2118 did not authorize the United States to act against Syria, rather, it
prohibited it. The Security Council passed Resolution 2118 after Syria
violated the Chemical Weapons Convention. 69 After the Ghouta attack, the
international community realized Syria still possessed the chemical weapons
it had earlier claimed to have disposed of. Before the attack, President Obama
stated the use of chemical weapons would not be tolerated at all. 70 Then,
when Syria disobeyed, Russia and the United States united to disarm Syria
of their chemical weapons and the Security Council passed Resolution
2118.71
The controlling portion of Resolution 2118 for the argument of illegalit y
condemns the actions of Syria and provides the removal of chemical
weapons, prohibits any action if the Syria breaches without going back to the
Security Council. Paragraph 21 states, “[the U.N.] [d]ecides, in the event of
non-compliance with this resolution, including unauthorized transfer of
chemical weapons, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in the Syrian
Arab Republic, to impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter.”72 This paragraph is open to serious debate. Article 39 of Chapter
VII, provides the U.N. must first discern if there is a breach of peace and then
it may use the remaining provisions in the chapters to act. 73 The debate is
whether paragraph 21 implies that action will automatically be taken in the
case of a breach, or if there needs to be a decision determining a breach of
the peace first and then go back to the Security Council again. Either way,
those who argue that President Trump’s actions are illegal argue it was the
Security Council who needed to act, and not the United States on their own
accord.
An additional argument is that President Trump’s actions were illegal under
domestic law. Shortly after the attack, ACLU National Security Lawyer Hina
Shamsi stated, “[u]se of chemical weapons is horrific, but Trump’s military
action violates the Constitution and U.N. Charter. No legit domestic or
international law basis.” 74 This domestic argument does not hold ground.
Under the United States Constitution, President Trump would need Congress
69

S.C. Res. 2118.
Wikipedia, supra note 23.
S.C. Res. 2118.
72
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73
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74
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70
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to declare war.75 Here, President Trump is not waging war, nor does he want
to declare war by himself. Nowhere in the Constitution does it say the
Commander-in-Chief is required to get Congress to sign off on any military
action. In fact, doing so would only delay any use of force, making it near
useless in moments of necessity.
President Trump’s missile strike did not follow the principles of jus in bello.
Assuming momentarily the U.S. response to Syria’s attack was legal, the
response itself could still be considered illegal if it did not follow jus in bello;
the law in war. In practice, jus in bello has evolved to mean the law in armed
conflict, because its pillars apply when armed force is used; either with or
without a declared state of war. The law has multiple pillars: necessity,
distinction, proportionality, and a potential fourth pillar which forbids
unnecessary suffering. 76 Under this doctrine, the main argument is that it was
not necessary for President Trump to fire 59 missiles at Syria because the use
of that many missiles and the killing of Syrians, was not proportional to the
task needed to be accomplished nor did it achieve any advantage. A brief
examination of the law of jus in bello will show that this simply is not the
case.
Necessity has been interpreted differently among scholars; ranging from a
free license to use whatever force “necessary” to get the job done to a
limitation that permits only the minimal force necessary to achieve the task
on the other.77 Generally, distinction is the law ensuring the targets chosen to
be attacked in an armed conflict must be enemy combatants and not
civilians.78 Finally, there is proportionality, a major part of jus in bello,79
which sometimes appears to overlap with necessity and distinction. It is an
analysis requiring a balance of the military advantage sought by the attack
against the risk of civilian life and destruction which the attack will cause. 80
The rules articulated by the Geneva Convention or by an individual nation’s
military, typically try to conform with customary international law. Both
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proportionality and distinction are discussed in Additional Protocol I of the
Geneva Convention.81 Article 52 states, “civilian objects shall not be the
object of attacks” and they “shall be limited strictly to military objectives.”82
It explains, “military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to militar y
action whose total or partial destruction . . . offers a definite military
advantage.”83 Article 57(5)(b) states, “an attack which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life . . . objects . . . or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated” is illegal. 84
The United States is not party to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva
Convention. Instead it has its own Law of War Manual. The provisions
within seem to lean more in favor of a broader scope for permissible action
in war. For instance, the definition of “military necessity” in the U.S. Manual
is “the principle that justifies the use of all measures needed to defeat the
enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible that are not prohibited by the
law of war.” 85 “Proportionality” is defined as “the principle that even where
one is justified in acting, one must not act in a way that is unreasonable or
excessive.” 86 The U.S. Manual also takes a broader view of distinction.
Under the Geneva Convention, a combatant is typically considered someone
who take up arms against a country, while under the U.S. Manual, a person
could not take up arms against the United States and still be considered a
valid object of attack. 87 Regardless of whether the claim of illegality is under
the Manual of War or the Geneva Convention, it appears the law in war was
followed in the strike against al-Shayrat.
Fifty-nine tomahawk missiles may seem excessive, especially when each one
of those missiles has a one-thousand-pound warhead.88 News reports have
given varying outcomes of the strike. As previously mentioned, Syria’s
Armed Forces General Command reported six people had died. 89 According
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to The LA Times, Syria reported six people dead at the base, while nine
civilians were killed in nearby villages. 90 Russian Defense Ministry
Spokesman Maj. Gen. Konashenkov, says the attack was ineffective and
alleges that only twenty-three of the fifty-nine missiles hit their target, while
the location of the other missiles is unknown. 91 Captain Jeff Davis—a
pentagon spokesman—stated, “[m]ilitary planners took precautions to
minimize risk to Russia or Syrian personal located at the airfield.” 92 Secretary
Tillerson said the act was proportional. 93 CNN posted, leaders believed the
missiles had demolished their intended targets. 94 Still others criticize the
attack because Syrian planes still took off from the airbase the very next
morning, implying the strike did not achieve any military advantage at all.95
In the instant case, President Trump’s actions were well within the legal
limits of jus in bello. When examining the legality of action taken in war, one
must extrapolate what the commanders believed would occur when they
ordered the strike. The “Rendulic Rule” asserts “the law of war recognizes
that persons must assess the military necessity of an action based on the
information available to them at that time.” 96 Applying the Rendulic Rule,
the U.S. was convinced the airstrike that delivered the sarin gas and killed
the civilians came from al-Shayrat Airbase. Not only did the strike
specifically target the combatant airbase, but according to Captain Davis, the
U.S. warned Syria and Russia that they were going to attack the base. 97 The
strike was ordered to happen at night when traffic on the military base was
low, not only to limit civilian casualties but also to make sure the lowest
number of combatants were killed as well. The missiles destroyed multiple
planes and a large portion of the airfield. The commanders could not have
predicted, planes would still be able to take off the next morning. It would be
horrible if civilians died, but the deaths were not foreseeable. The U.S. met
the necessity element because in the past, U.N. orders to President al-Assad
to get rid of the sarin gas had not worked and hitting the planes delivering
the gas would have a direct impact. Secretary Tellerson correctly asserts that
this attack was proportional. The attack not only aligned with the Department
of Defense’s Law of War Manual, but also with Additional Protocol I of the
Geneva Convention which the U.S. has not adopted. Therefore, President
90
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Trump’s strike did not violate jus in bello and cannot be cited as the reason
the attacks were illegal.
In summation, many arguments have been made for the illegality of President
Trump’s action against Syria, but the sole persuasive argument for its
illegality is that it was not authorized by the U.N.. The U.S. followed the
principles of jus in bello by conducting a strike against combatants and by
planning for the lowest number of casualties that would produce the highest
military impact at the time of the attack. Regardless, it was an act of
aggression that was not done out of self-defense. However, in order for it to
be illegal those factors must be coupled with an act, lacking authorization
from the U.N. Security Council.
III.

PRESIDENT TRUMP’S ACTIONS HAVE BEEN
DEFENDED BY POINTING TO: (1) AN OBIGATION
UNDER THE “RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT”; AND
(2) LEGAL AUTHORIZATION FROM THE U.N. IN
RESPOSNE TO SYRIA’S VIOLATIONS OF THE
CHEMICAL
WEAPONS
CONVENTION
AND
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540 AND 2118.

First, there is a claim; the President’s actions were an obligation under the
“Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). This argument would be fitting because
the attack was proportional and would fall within the same rationale;
however, the R2P has not been adopted by the U.N. as officially binding, and
it cannot be claimed as a legal justification, despite the emergence of
International Humanitarian Law. Next, one could argue Syria violated the
Security Council Resolutions and Chemical Weapons Convention it was
bound to follow. Further, the U.S. had authorization by the U.N. to act.
Additionally, it can be argued allowing those violations to go unpunished is
illogical. While there is debate as to whether the Security Council
Resolutions allow for action to be taken, it seems the Resolutions intended
Syria to face consequences for future violations, and it appears that they may
have given the U.S. authority to act, in the event of humanitarian issues.
President Trump’s action was legal under the “Responsibility to Protect.”
David M. Tafuri—an author for Politico—defends President Trump’s action
by claiming legality under the R2P. 98 While the emerging R2P is extremely
on point and would justify the attack on al-Shayrat Airbase, it is not yet
98
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considered binding international law and cannot be used as a justification for
the tomahawk strike. The R2P was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
at the 2005 World Summit in paragraph 138 and 13999 , it was reaffirmed in
2006 in Security Council Resolution 1674 which dealt with the protection of
armed conflict for civilians in Somalia 100 , and remains under debate as of
2009.101 The R2P essentially brings forth the proposition that “each
individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. . . the international
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this
responsibility.” 102
Mr. Tafuri’s argument sheds light on International Human Rights Law, or
International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This law “applies to the belligerent
parties irrespective of reasons for the conflict or the justness of the causes for
which they are fighting. If it were otherwise, implementing the law would be
impossible, since every party would claim to be a victim of aggression.” 103
The Red Cross explains, the R2P exists so “that the international community
never again fails to act in the face of genocide and other gross forms of human
rights abuse.” 104 Specifically, the R2P was created as a response to the
atrocities in Uganda. 105 The R2P stands behind the proposition, if people are
killed with sarin gas then the country that was attacked has the right to defend
itself, and if it is unable to do so, the international community is obligated to
step in and prevent such atrocities from happening.
First, Syria signed the Chemical Weapons Convention acknowledging
international sentiment; the use of chemical weapons constitutes an
egregious act.106 President Obama threatened action if President Bashar alAssad used chemical weapons. 107 Next, Syria used sarin gas in the Ghouta
attack, killing hundreds of civilians near Damascus. 108 The international
community responded by implementing a strategy to eliminate the chemical
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weapons that Syria should not have had in their country in the first place. 109
Then, Syria used sarin gas again in this retaliatory attack. If ever there was a
time to implement the R2P this would have been it, because Syria did, and
continues to, violate IHL in their civil war efforts. The attack was a
proportional and swift response to human rights violation, fitting within the
parameters of the R2P.
Unfortunately, as convenient and logical as it may be to cite the R2P as a
legal justification, it cannot be considered one. The International Committee
for the Red Cross acknowledges this when it disclaims, “IHL provides no
such basis for legalizing or legitimizing the resort to force in international
relations” and “[a]lthough R2P is referred to sometimes as an ‘emerging
norm,’ it is not a binding legal obligation committing the international
community, but a political one.” 110 One could argue that Article 89 of
Protocol I to the Geneva Convention allows states “to act, jointly or
individually, in cooperation with the United Nations.” 111 However, the
United States has not adopted Protocol I. Therefore, R2P cannot be a legal
justification for the tomahawk strike.
President Trump’s action was authorized by the Security Council in
Response to Syria’s Violations of Security Council Resolutions 1540, 2118,
and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
President Trump’s actions have been justified by all the violations Syria has
committed. Syria violated the Chemical Weapons Convention and ignored
both Security Council Resolution 1540, and 2118. However, despite good
intentions, acting without authorization may be considered a form of
international vigilantism and might still be illegal. Whether the U.S. was
authorized to use force is debated in text of the resolutions themselves.
Ultimately, the language of the Security Council Resolutions and the
condemnation of this crime by the international community are the strongest
arguments for the justification of President Trump’s tomahawk missile strike.
The Chemical Weapons Convention does not allow the possession of
chemical weapons, let alone the use of them. 112 Similarly, Security Council
Resolution 1540 forbids the use of chemical weapons, demanding that
countries establish domestic law to prevent the proliferation of these
weapons.113 To eliminate weapons of mass destruction—including chemical
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weapons—the Security Council created Resolution 1540. Under the
authority of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Council recognizes, in
paragraph 6, “that some States may require assistance in implementing the
provisions of this resolution [to get rid of chemical weapons] and invites
States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to
specific requests to States lacking regulatory infrastructure.” 114 At first
glance, this looks like a winning ticket for legal justification. The victims of
President al-Assad’s chemical weapon attacks have cried out for help, but
they lack the infrastructure necessary to stop him. The United States military
has the infrastructure; however, the victims are not a “state” asking for help;
rather, rebels and victims within a state, so it sadly cannot be cited as a reason.
Resolution 2118 stresses seven different times that chemical weapons are a
threat to international peace and security. 115 As mentioned earlier in the
argument for illegality, the U.N. in Resolution 2118, “[d]ecides, in the event
of non-compliance . . . to impose measures under Chapter VII.” 116 Notice that
the provision does not say the Security Council may decide to impose action
under Chapter VIII. Instead, it says it will impose Chapter VII measures.
Furthermore, the removal plan laid out in the resolution created an action
group with the United States as a member. 117 One of the responsibilities of
the action group is laid out in section 10 entitled “Safety, stability and
calm.”118 It states, in Annex II, section 10, paragraph (b) that safety, stability,
and calm “requires: . . . (b) [e]ffective steps to ensure that vulnerable groups
are protected and that immediate action is taken to address humanitarian
issues in areas of need.”119 This language is the U.N. authorizing action to be
taken to address humanitarian issues. Returning to the Security Council to
obtain further permission would defeat the purpose of section 10, because it
does not allow for “immediate action to be taken ‘to address humanitarian
issue’ and make sure that “vulnerable groups are protected.” 120
Still one could argue, imposing Chapter VII measures mandate the writing of
another resolution. Entertaining this argument requires multiple
considerations. First, this means the Security Council would have to vote for
action to be taken against Syria even after Syria already violated Security
Council Resolution 1540, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and
Resolution 2118. How many times can a country egregiously violate an
international norm they agreed to uphold and get away with it? It appears
Syria was trying to find out. Second, if the Security Council had to authorize
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Id.
S.C. Res. 2118.
Id.
Id.
Id.
S.C. Res. 2118.
Id.

2019]
101

THE LEGALITY OF PRESIDENT TRUMP’S MISSILE STRIKE

action to uphold Resolution 2118, it would not be able to pass since both
Russia and the United States have veto power as one of the five permanent
members of the Security Council. Russia sides with President al-Assad, while
the United States firmly believes he is responsible for the heinous act. This
inability to act means the strong language from the resolution claiming, “that
the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international
law, and stressing that those responsible for any use of chemical weapons
must be held accountable,” will go unheeded as nothing more than strong
words on a sheet of paper. Finally, the language of the resolution looks as
though it gave the U.S. authority to act, and why would the U.N. threaten the
use of force under Chapter VII if it could not deliver.
In conclusion, the R2P, although a very fitting doctrine, does not justify
President Trump’s action in Syria, but the language of and sentiment behind
Resolution 2118 may have given him the authority he needed to act.
IV.

PRESIDENT TRUMP’S STRIKE WAS LEGAL BECAUSE
THE UNITED NATIONS AUTHORIZED IT; AND, EVEN
IF IT WAS ILLEGAL, IT WAS MORALLY NECESSARY
TO HOLD SYRIA ACCOUNTABLE FOR ITS ACTIONS,
AND WAS JUSTIFIABLE REGARDLESS.

Ultimately, it appears President Trump’s action in using the Tomahawk
missiles against al-Shayrat Airbase was legal under international law. The
arguments against the legality do not squash the overwhelming sentiment
against the use of chemical weapons and the fact that authority was given.
This was an act of aggression as defined by the U.N. It was also not done in
self-defense against an imminent threat to the United States. Although the
argument that the United States did not have authorization from the U.N.—
because the Security Council would have to examine a violation and
decided which action to take—is somewhat persuasive, the language in the
Annex II of Resolution 2118 gave the United States the necessary
authorization. The action itself was planned against combatants, and
calculated the smallest number of civilian and combatant deaths to destroy
the planes that did, and could, carry out a chemical attack on Syrian
civilians. The United States had authority from the U.N. and followed jus in
bello, thus making President Trump’s action legal.
Even if President Trump’s actions were not legal under international law,
the attack was morally justifiable. The Trump administration, along with
most of the international community, knew that President Bashar al-Assad
was using chemical weapons in a civil war against his own people. He has
defied the Chemical Weapons Convention, multiple Security Council
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Resolutions, President Obama’s warning. This situation is slightly
analogous to President Clinton’s air campaign with NATO in Kosovo,
where they could have gone to the Security Council, but it would have
gotten shot down. It is better to defy the authority of the United Nations and
risk punishment, then to simply permit egregious atrocities when they could
have been prevented. Therefore, any language possibly allowing action in
response to the multiple violations President al-Assad has committed is
worth considering, and even if it doesn’t prevail, it was still morally
justifiable. In conclusion, President Trump’s tomahawk missile strike on
the al-Shayrat Airbase was legal, and if it wasn’t it, it was morally
justifiable.

